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INTRODUCTION 
William Faulkner and S¢ren Kierkegaard, although 
separated in time by almost a century, possess a common 
concern: both are deeply interested in the numerous ways 
in which individuals live out their lives in either hope 
or despair. Exploring the avenues which might alleviate 
this despair and providing a basis for hope are tasks 
both authors have accepted as theirs. 
This paper relates three novels by Faulkner to the 
stages of existence set forth by Kierkegaard in much of 
his philosophical writing. I intend to show that Faulk-
ner's characters serve as illustrations of different 
ways in which an individual may exist in these stages. 
The result of a juxtaposition of these characters with 
Kierkegaard's stages of existence is a greater insight 
into the motivations, the obsessions, and the successes 
and failures of Faulknerian characters. 
The three novels I have chosen for this task are 
The Sound and the Fury, Light in August, and Absalom, 
Absalom! In each of his novels, Faulkner presents dif-
ferent characters who cope with life in very different 
ways. The novels I have selected, however, provide the 
same diversity with which Kierkegaard himself illustrates 
1 
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his stages. Although many of the major characters in 
the selected novels dwell in the same stage of exist-
ence, the various ways in which they inhabit the same 
stage are illuminating. 
Chapter one is a discussion of the three stages 
of existence set forth by Kierkegaard. This chapter 
provides the background upon which the following chap-
ters are based. The subsequent chapters show how the 
characters in each novel exemplify Kierkegaard's stages. 
Chapter two, a discussion of The Sound and the Fury, il-
lustrates that most of the characters in this novel 
dwell in Kierkegaard's aesthetical stage, but not in 
identical ways. One character reaches a slightly higher 
stage: the aesthetic-ethical; and there is one character 
who reaches the religious stage, a phenomenon which both 
Kierkegaard and Faulkner consider rare, but which Kierke-
gaard considers absolutely necessary for the most mean-
ingful existence. Chapter three is a discussion of 
Light in August and the ways in which two of the major 
characters in this novel exist in either the aesthetical, 
' 
the aesthetic-ethical, or the ethical stage. Chapter 
four is a discussion of Absalom, Absalom! and Thomas 
Sutpen, the character who dominates the book. In his 
personality, characteristics of both the aesthete and 
the ethicist are evident; therefore, he inhabits the 
aesthetic-ethical stage. The conclusion brings together 
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the characters who exist in the same stage and compares 
and contrasts those characters as they exemplify differ-
ent ways of dwelling in the aesthetical, the ethical, 
and the religious stages. The result is the creation 
of a Kierkegaardian structure using the individual char-
acters previously discussed. 
CHAPTER I 
STAGES OF EXISTENCE 
S¢ren Kierkegaard is considered the forerunner of 
existential philosophy. To exemplify what he calls 
"stages" or "spheres" of existence, he presents numerous 
characters who represent diverse attitudes which indi-
viduals may assume toward their own being. The charac-
ters in Faulkner's novels illustrate further these same 
stages of existence. More important, however, is the 
illumination a Kierkegaardian reading provides in the 
understanding of Faulkner's characters. When Kierke-
gaard's stages are used to classify Faulkner's charac-
ters, the reader begins to see more clearly why so many 
of these characters seem doomed to failure. Similarly, 
those characters who manage to succeed manage to do so 
because of the higher stage of existence which they have 
reached. 
Kierkegaard presents nis stages through various 
pseudonymous characters. These characters are either 
reputed to be authors of entire books by Kierkegaard or 
publishers of books which include the works of other 
pseudonymous authors. Ronald Grimsley explains the 
significance of the pseudonymns in this way: 
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By the use of pseudonymns . • . Kierke-
gaard was depicting certain aspects of exis-
tence which, though bearing some resemblance 
to the imaginative possibilities of his own 
being, never corresponded exactly to his true 
self and were, in any case, intended primarily 
as objective descriptions and typical examples 
of particular stages of human existence. As 
such, they had an absolute and "ideal" quality 
lacking in any ordinary individual. In this 
way Kierkegaard was able to set a certain 
distance between himself and his work, and to 
consider it as something with which he was 
not personally identified in any narrow sense, 
but which none the less contained some of his 
deepest convictions about the meaning of human 
existence ••.. By means of his pseudonymous 
authorship Kierkegaard was also hoping to 
forestall the objection that he was parading 
before the public as a teacher who ought to 
be heeded in his own right; by concealing his 
identity, he made his own personal involvement 
or lack of it irrelevant to the validity of 
his message. 1 
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According to Kierkegaard, there are three distinct 
stages of existence in which a man might dwell: the 
aesthetic, the ethical, and the religious. The first 
of these, the aesthetic, is the stage of sensuousness 
and objectivity. Judge William, one of the pseudonyms, 
sees the sensual as momentary and transient. 2 The per-
son who dwells in this stage seeks instant gratification; 
consequently, this stage is·correctly associated with 
lust. In fact, Judge William's discussion of the aes-
thete is addressed to a young man who pursues a life of 
eroticism. An important consideration, however, is the 
fact that the aesthete characteristically finds meaning 
for his existence in external stimuli and depends upon 
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these stimuli for making sense out of his environment. 
Granted, the external stimulus is often in the form of 
a beautiful woman and has erotic associations, but this 
is not the only kind of appeal to which the aesthete 
responds. The pleasures of Kierkegaard's aesthete are 
not restricted to physical pleasures. As George Bedell 
observes, "They may include the highly sophisticated ob-
jectivity of a philosopher as well as the sensualism of 
a Don Juan." 3 * It is interesting to note that Kierke-
gaard uses the terms sensual and aesthetic interchange-
ably and restricts neither to the erotic. Speaking of 
the reluctance of a man to be torn away from the delu-
sion of happiness and shown the truth, he explains the 
reluctance in this way: "The reason is that the sensuous 
nature and the psycho-sensuous completely dominate him; 
the reason is that he lives in the sensuous categories 
agreeable/disagreeable, and says goodby to truth, etc.; 
the reason is that he is too sensuous to have the cour-
age to be spirit or to endure it." 4 Sensuousness, im-
mediacy, and aestheticism are all terms Kierkegaard 
uses to denote the individual who lives for the moment 
and finds meaning for his existence outside himself. 
An essential characteristic of the aesthete, per-
*The philosopher, who thinks about life without 
making choices, thereby maintains an objective detach-
ment from life~an aesthetic characteristic discussed in 
the next paragraph. 
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haps as important as sensuousness, is objectivity. Al-
though the terms seem to imply a contradiction, none 
exists as Kierkegaard uses them. The aesthete wants to 
maintain a detachment from other people and from life. 
He has no objection to being loved, but he avoids giving 
love in return. Friendship, according to "A" (an aes-
thetic pseudonym), is to be strictly avoided, and one 
must never enter into the relationship of marriage. 
Furthermore, "A" believes that one only enjoys that 
which one can control. It is important, then, that one 
always control his moods and avoid sentimentality. 5 
This reasoning leads the aesthete to think of other peo-
ple and his own body as objects, both to be con.trolled 
and manipulated. Because of his dependence on the sensu-
ous and on the moment, which is continually vanishing, 
his choice of his body is neither serious nor permanent. 
His body is important only in an uncertain way. As 
Kierkegaard puts it, "The immediate man ... is merely 
soulishly determined, his self or he himself is a some-
thing included along with 'the other' in the compass of 
the temporal and the worldly, and it has only an illu-
sory appearance of possessing in it something eternal. 
Thus the self coheres immediately with 'the other,' 
wishing, desiring, enjoying, etc., but passively .. 
Its dialectic is: the agreeable and the disagreeable; 
its concepts are: good fortune, misfortune, fate." 6 
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The aesthete puts himself at the mercy of fate. 
He considers events either fortunate or unfortunate, de-
pending on how he is affected by them. He never assumes 
responsibility for his actions and usually thinks of 
himself as the one things are done to rather than as the 
one who does. "He is not in control of his destiny; 
something else is." 7 
The aesthete may respond to suffering in several 
ways. He may cherish suffering as a way to avoid choos-
ing the person he will be; he may turn his back on suf-
fering and pretend it does not exist; or he may allow 
himself to be overcome by and thus determined by it. 
But no matter which attitude he assumes, he will con-
sider suffering as an effect caused by something exter-
nalto himself and accidental to his true nature. Suf-
fering or not suffering becomes a matter of fortune or 
misfortune, a matter over which he has no control. 
Kierkegaard believes that if one dwells in the 
aesthetical mode of existence, the only possible result 
is despair. The ability to choose is of major impor-
. 
tance. But the aesthete avoids making decisions; indeed, 
he believes that he has no choice and is thereby himself 
responsible for his inability to choose and for his de-
spair. Above all, the aesthete wishes to maintain a de-
tached view of life; and, because of this dissociation, 
he finds life empty and meaningless. He tries to evade 
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the demands of time and concentrates instead on the 
pleasures of the moment. Despair results when the pres-
ent moment is considered all there is. Or, as Kirke-
gaard puts it, "To despair is to lose the eternal." 8 
The second stage of existence in Kierkegaard's 
classification is the ethical. The person who exists 
in this stage is governed by the demands of universal 
law. He believes that he can choose his best or ideal 
self. The ethical person has great confidence in his 
ability to choose~he chooses the good because he knows 
what is good. His life is shaped in keeping with the 
demands and principles of society. "The paradigm of 
this modality is marriage and especially the marriage 
vows •... the ethical person believes he can choose 
his partner with complete and absolute ingenuousness. 
He also believes that marital sex is the basic symbol of 
the conjugal alliance; his relationship to his body is 
therefore entirely instrumental." 9 
The aesthete objects vigorously to the ethicist's 
claims for marriage. According to "A", the promise 
couples make to love each other eternally has no mean-
ing: if love will end in time, it will also end in 
eternity. He thinks the promise might be valid if the 
couple promised "until Easter, or until May-day comes" 
instead. But his major objection is that one loses his 
freedom in marriage. "Marriage brings one into fatal 
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connection with custom and tradition, and traditions 
and customs are like the wind and weather, altogether 
incalculable." 10 The aesthete will have nothing what-
ever to do with the demands of society or with duty. 
The ethical person, like the aesthete, considers 
the source of suffering to be fate, but his attitude to-
ward it is different. He struggles to overcome suffer-
ing in some way. He will deliberately choose suffering 
as a way of confirming himself. Suffering becomes an 
integral part of his basic self. 
Since the ethical incorporates the attempt to rec-
ognize human potentiality, it is considered the most hu-
manistic of the stages. Self-realization is the goal of 
the ethical man, and he must seek this realization with-
in himself. His search for self-realization and the 
ethical stage must be based on an obedience to the dic-
tates of duty. In order to progress beyond this stage, 
he must eventually reach a point of resignation, for "to 
resign oneself is to make the final choice, and in doing 
so, to pull the fangs of despair. Resignation is, 
therefore, the act in which ·the absolute self is chosen 
absolutely; it is created; it comes into being." 11 This 
is the resignation of absolute choice, the choice to 
pursue life regardless of its flaws. It is an absolute 
choice as far as Kierkegaard is concerned because it 
leads to the "leap" into religiousness. In other words, 
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although it is an ethical choice, it is a means of re-
leasing oneself from ethical despair. 
Obviously, then, the ethical stage, though more 
satisfactory than the aesthetic, is not to be consid-
ered the highest aim. With its emphasis on human capa-
bility, it has no place for the concept of sin; and be-
cause it has no place for this concept, it ultimately 
fails. Johannes de Silentio, pseudonymous author of 
Fear and Trembling, explains this way: 
The ethical as such is the universal, and 
as the universal it applies to everyone 
. • Conceived immediately as physical 
and psychical, the particular individual is 
the individual who has his telos* in the 
universal, and his ethical task is to ex-
press himself constantly in it. • • .As ~oon 
as the individual would assert himself in 
his particularity over against the universal 
he sins, and only by recognizing this can he 
again reconcile himself with the universal. 12 
But the ethical individ~al, unless he is willing through 
resignation to choose the religious stage, cannot accept 
the concept of sin. His duty is to society; whereas the 
idea of sin requires a duty to God. Anti-Climacus, 
pseudonymous author of Training in Christianity, is even 
more emphatic than Johannes: "Only the consciousness of 
sin is the expression of absolute respect . . . because 
Christianity requires absolute respect ... only con-
sciousness of sin is the way of entrance [into Chris-
*End or fulfillment. 
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tianity]. II l 3 
The third and final stage of existence is the re-
ligious, which is related to the absurd and the para-
doxical, both of which are related to the fact that the 
eternal has been embodied in time. In Kierkegaard's 
words, "The eternal truth has come into being in time: 
this is the paradox .•.. the eternal essential truth is 
not behind him but in front of him, through its being in 
existence or having existed, so that, if the individual 
does not existentially and in existence lay hold of the 
truth, he will never lay hold of it." 14 Kierkegaard 
explains further by defining the absurd in similar 
terms: "The absurd is-that the eternal truth has come 
into being in time, that God has come into being, has 
been born, has grown up, and so forth, has come into be-
ing precisely like any other individual human being, 
quite indistinguishable from other individuals. 1115 
Kierkegaard cites two ways of dwelling in the re-
ligious stage: "religiousness A" and "religiousness B." 
In religiousness A, the individual is "self-consciously 
a part of history but allows himself to be destroyed as 
an existing individual in order that God may have his 
way in the world ••.. Because he finds his own selfhood 
as obstruction to a relationship with God, the self must 
be annihilated. He sees a complete identification of 
time with eternity and worships an immanental God." 16 
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In this type of religiousness, nature and history are 
especially important, and sacraments and ritual become 
highly significant. Religiousness A does not represent 
Kierkegaard's mature view of religion. He later came 
to understand the paradoxical religion of religiousness 
Bas the heart of Christianity. 17 
In religiousness B, the individual is not de-
stroyed. He is in the world but not of it. The world 
no longer controls him, but "he does not feel compelled 
to remove himself from the world in order that God may 
appear." 18 He understands fully that the eternal is 
embodied in time, and this understanding gives new mean-
ing to the relationship of time and eternity. Existence 
becomes a process of working toward God while discover-
ing at the same time that God has already come. 
The religious person deliberately chooses suffer-
ing and considers it something worthwhile in itself. 
Although the ethical individual also chooses suffering 
deliberately, his motives are different. He chooses it 
because he considers a choice of suffering a heroic 
choice, a way of affirming his worth. In making this 
choice, he hopes to wipe out the accidental quality in-
herent in fate, the cause of his suffering. His choice 
is therefore a resistance, not an acquiescence. The re-
ligious person, on the other hand, considers suffering 
an essential part of his lot in life. The choice of 
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suffering is a part of his choice to accept life with 
all of its flaws. "He has passed through the strenuous 
stage of resignation and ideality and has once more 
been able to choose the finite (suffering) by virtue of 
the fact that the Eternal has made itself known to him 
in the midst of the finite (and, incidentally, in the 
form of suffering). Suffering .•. is part and parcel 
of finite existence where God is known." 19 Existence 
becomes a matter of assuming a new posture before suf-
fering rather than of learning to cope with suffering. 
The important thing is not the immanental or direct re-
lationship to God emphasized in religiousness A, but 
"becoming edified through a new kind of eternal.i ty-
putting oneself at the disposal of the Infinite who ap-
pears as the finite. Which means, very simply yet de-
ceptively, to serve one's fellows. One suffers because 
that is the way it is; one suffers because God was made 
flesh. 1120 Suffering is worthwhile for the person in 
religiousness B because in serving one's fellows, one 
also serves God. 
Resignation, the final step necessary before the 
"leap" into religiousness, requires both courage and 
fortitude. It is not, however, a ~esult of faith. It 
is dependent upon what is within the individual, not 
upon a sovereign power beyond him. It is the will to 
choose and thus prevents the ethical individual from 
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slipping back into the aesthetical stage. Faith, on 
the other hand, is something that the individual re-
ceives; it is not necessary to renounce anything in 
faith. Courage is required, but not the kind of cour-
age that requires an act of the will. It is the cour-
age to accept graciously that which is bestowed upon 
one, whether he deserves or desires it or not. The in-
dividual is again at the mercy of the external, but 
this time the external is in the form of God. 
Kierkegaard does not specifically outline the re-
lationship between the three stages; however, certain 
conclusions may be drawn. Walter Lowrie, in his intro-
duction to Stages on Life's Way, has made several ob-
servations: 
We need in fact to be warned not to regard 
the three stages as a prescribed curriculum 
which one must pass through in advancing 
from youth to age. Such is not S.K.'s 
meaning. He is not so foolish as to think 
that one must be an unhappy exception . . 
in order to attain the religious stage~ 
any more than one must first be a seducer 
in order to become a proper ma~ried man 
like the Judge. Neither does he represent 
that one stage must be definitely left be-
hind before a man enters upon the next. 
He affirms in fact of the aesthetic that 
it is never superseded but only "dethroned'' 
.•.. S.K. defines the three spheres only 
in the briefest and most general terms, but 
he is copious in depicting the characters 
who exemplify them. They do not exemplify 
any stage purely, as a logical system would 
require, for they represent the existential 
possibilities which lie between immediacy 
and spirit. The logical delimitation of 
the spheres is confounded by the movement 
in which each individual is involved, the 
direction of this movement is the prime 
consideration, and this is aptly indicated 
by the word "stages." "There are many 
ways which lead to the same truth, and 
each man takes his own." So said S. K. in 
the first of the Three Discourses which 
accompanied this book. 21 
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Frater Taciturnus, another of Kierkegaard's pseu-
donyms, enlightens us further by explaining that the 
ethical stage is one of transition, but that one does 
not necessarily pass through it only once. 22 An indi-
vidual might therefore vacillate between the aesthetical 
and the ethical stages several times before reaching the 
religious stage; he might never reach the religious 
stage; or he might live in either the ethical or the 
aesthetical stage without ever moving to the other. 
Moreover, though the ethical and the aesthetical are 
necessarily preliminary· to the religious stage (one is 
not created in the religious stage from birth}, it is 
impossible to reach another stage by mere development. 
Only through the Kierkegaardian "leap" can the movement 
to another stage be accomplished. A logical progression 
from the aesthetical throug4 the ethical to the reli-
gious stage is possible, but this type of progression is 
neither necessary nor preferable. 
For Kierkegaard, existence is a state of becoming. 
The task of every individual is to become himself, and 
he can perform this task only by means of a relation-
ship to God. If he fails, he is in despair, whether 
17 
he knows it or not. Kierkegaard puts it this way: 
" ... a self, every instant it exists, is in process 
of becoming, for the self ... does not actually exist, 
it is only that which it is to become. In so far as the 
self does not become itself, it is not its own self; but 
not to be one's own self is despair." 23 The paradoxical 
nature of this statement is explained by Kierkegaard's 
belief that the self is a synthesis of two factors, one 
of which is constantly the opposite of the other. This 
synthesis consists of the finite, which is the limiting 
factor, and the infinite, which is the expanding factor. 
Thus, because of the finitude inherent in man's nature, 
he must be himself; and because of the infinitude inher-
ent in his nature, he must become himself. Kierkegaard 
is therefore convinced that the individual who has reached 
the religious stage, though he feels no impulse to go 
further than becoming a Christian, feels an impulse to 
go further in becoming a Christian. 2 ~ 
It is clear that, according to Kierkegaard, the 
ultimate end of living in the aesthetical or the ethical 
stage is disappointment at the least or, more likely, 
despair. Specifically, 
Every human existence which is not conscious of 
itself before God as spirit, every human exist-
ence which is not thus grounded transparently 
in God but obscurely reposes or terminates in 
some abstract universality . . • or which, in 
obscurity about itself, takes its faculties 
merely as active powers, without in a deeper 
sense being conscious whence it has them, which 
regards itself as an inexplicable something 
which is to be understood per se--every 
such existence, whatever it accomplishes, 
though it be the most amazing exploit, what-
ever it explains, though it were the whole 
of existence, however intensely it enjoys 
life aesthetically--every such existence is 
after all despair. 25 
Those who live satisfactory lives are those who have 
managed to reach the stage of religiousness. 
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Although a comparison of the beliefs of Faulkner 
and Kierkegaard is not the primary concern of this study, 
there are certain parallels which are relevant. Both 
writers are concerned with the problem of alienation. 
There is evidence in Faulkner's works that this aliena-
tion is caused by a failure to establish meaningful rela-
tionships with God and with other people, while at the 
same time maintaining one's individuality and one's free-
dom. Quentin Compson, Jason Compson, Joe Christmas, and 
Thomas Sutpen are all examples of characters who are 
alienated from their surroundings through a failure to 
relate themselves meaningfully to God and to other peo-
ple. Dilsey is an example of the reverse: she does not 
experience alienation because she manages to establish 
meaningful relationships. 
Kierkegaard's view is similar to Faulkner's. He 
also extols the worth of the individual: "I broke with 
the public not out of pride and arrogance, etc., 
but because I was conscious of being a religious author 
and as such was concerned with 'the individual' ('the 
individual'~in contrast to 'the public'), a thought in 
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which is contained an entire philosophy of life and of 
the world." 26 
As for alienation, Kierkegaard attributes it pri-
marily to man's failure to relate himself properly to 
God. Alienation is eliminated through love: "If anyone 
... will not learn from Christianity to love himself 
in the right way, then neither can he love his neighbor; 
he may perhaps . 'for life and death' cling to one 
or several other human beings, but this is by no means 
loving one's neighbor. To love one's self in the right 
way and to love one's neighbor are absolutely analogous 
concepts, are at bottom one and the same." 27 
In The Point of View for My Work as an Au~hor, 
Kierkegaard asserts that he was always a religious au-
thor, even when he wrote his most aesthetic works. 28 
The aesthetic works were written because he believed 
that, in order to instruct men and bring them into con-
tact with the religious stage, he must first get in 
touch with them by beginning where most of them are. 
In other words, he must begin with aesthetic achieve-
ment. 29 
Religion·is important to Faulkner also: "I'm not 
talking about a personified or a mechanical God, but a 
God who is the most complete expression of mankind, a 
.God who rests both in eternity and the now ..•• There 
is only the present moment, in which I include both the 
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past and the future, and that is eternity." 3 ° Faulk-
ner's view here is essentially the same as Kierkegaard's 
assertion that the eternal is embodied in time. A paral-
lel exists also in the fact that Faulkner, in refuting a 
personified God, does the same thing that Kierkegaard 
does in refuting the immanental or direct relationship 
to God: 
All paganism consists in this, that God is 
related to man directly, as the extraordinary 
is to the astonished observer. But the spir-
itual relationship to God in the truth, i.e., 
in inwardness, is conditioned by a prior ir-
ruption of inwardness, which corresponds to 
the divine elusiveness that God has absolutely 
nothing obvious about Him, that God is so far 
from being obvious, that .He is invisible. It 
cannot immediately occur to anyone that He 
exists, although His invisibility is again 
His omnipresence. 31 · 
Another parallel can be seen in Faulkner's atti-
tude toward suffering. This parallel is evident in 
Faulkner's works: "Faulkner's noblest characters," 
Cleanth Brooks has noted, "are willing to face the fact 
that most men can learn the deepest truths about them-
selves and about reality only through suffering. Hurt 
and pain and loss are not me.re accidents to which the 
human being is subject; nor are they mere punishments 
incurred by human error; they can be the means to the 
deeper knowledge and to the more abundant life." 32 If 
many of Faulkner's characters fail to achieve the more 
abundant life, it is partially because they do not 
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assume the proper attitude toward suffering. Those 
characters who accept suffering as their lot in life 
without allowing it to plunge them into despair are the 
ones who are able to reach the highest stages of exist-
ence. 
In The Sound and the Fury, in Light in August, 
and in Absalom, Absalom! the appearance of the essen-
tially religious character is either rare or non-
existent. The infrequent appearance of the religious 
character in Faulkner is not in contradiction to 
Kierkegaard's view of the situation of mankind. Ac-
cording to Kierkegaard, most people who call themselves 
Christians are not Christians at all: "If then.· 
the greater number of people in Christendom only imagine 
themselves to be Christians, in what categories do they 
live? They live in aesthetic, or at the most, in 
aesthetic-ethical categories." 33 In Faulkner's novels 
also, the aesthetic and the aesthetic-ethical cate-
gories predominate. 
CHAPTER II 
THE SOUNV ANV THE FURY 
The Sound and the Fury, a study in "the fragmenta-
tion of modern man," 3 ~ presents characters who, for the 
most part, dwell in Kierkegaard's aesthetical stage. 
Both Quentin and Jason inhabit this stage, but not in 
the same manner. Mr. and Mrs. Compson, also, have their 
particular manners of dwelling in the aesthetical stage; 
and, to a certain extent, so does Caddy. Just as there 
are various ways of dwelling in the aesthetical stage 
(and in the ethical), 35 the effects upon different per-
sons dwelling in this stage will be somewhat diverse. 
For example, Quentin, Jason, and Caddy have problems 
with their attitudes toward time. Quentin's problem is 
the past; Jason's, the future. Caddy inhabits the pres-
ent, concentrating on the pleasures of the moment. Each 
attitude is an aesthetic one in that not one of these 
characters sees the eternar embodied in time. 
Quentin's problem is that he never makes a funda-
mental choice regarding his own being. He allows ex-
ternal circumstances~the past of childhood and youth 
in general and his sister Caddy's loss of innocence in 
that past specifically~to dominate and even possess 
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every act in the present. Reality is the enemy. Quen-
tin will go to any lengths to deny the validity of life 
as it is, and the lengths to which he will go are il-
lustrated in his relationship to Caddy. In reference 
to their "incest" he thinks, "Because if it were just 
to hell; if that were all of it. Finished. If things 
just finished themselves. Nobody else there but her 
and me. If we could just have done something so dread-
ful that they would have fled hell except us." 36 The 
following is also pertinent: "If it could just be a 
hell beyond that: the clean flame the two of us more 
than dead. Then you will have onl~ me then the two of 
us amid the pointing and the horror beyond the clean 
flame" (p. 135). He wants to wipe out the reality of 
Caddy's loss of innocence, to deny that Caddy is "bad," 
as she says. But more than that, the ideas of the 
"clean flame," of things finishing themselves, and of 
being "more than dead'' indicate a desire on Quentin's 
part to become an object and to make an object of 
Caddy also. The ideas are counter to meaningful exis-
tence because, to Kierkegaard, existence is by nature a 
state of becoming. The aesthete in effect denies exis-
tence by refusing to exercise his ability to choose. 
One cannot become anything without making a choice. 
Quentin's refusal to exercise this ability assures his 
alienation from God and from himself. 
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The aesthete, according to Judge William, wishes 
above all to remain outside himself. 37 Quentin's in-
wardness is the quality necessary to leap into the ethi-
cal stage, but he refuses to exercise the power of 
choice which would make the leap possible. He wants to 
avoid the choice between aesthetic and ethical existence 
by avoiding himself, and becoming an object would accom-
plish both purposes. His sense of guilt, whether well-
founded or not, makes inwardness too painful for him. 
Getting outside himself (in effect, becoming an object) 
would eliminate the pain he now feels; and if he could 
make an object of Caddy also, both would be safe from 
the guilt and unpleasantness suggested by his ~xpression 
"the pointing and the horror" of life. 
Quentin is not actually sexually attracted to his 
sister. The world the two of them inhabited as children 
is established in his memory as an idyllic place where 
things are perfect and good. The reality of the present 
is too much for him to bear, but he realizes (though 
dimly) the impossibility of an actual return to the 
past. What he longs for is the innocent Caddy, and he 
wants her to belong to him alone. Since the innocent 
Caddy no longer exists, his only alternative is to have 
her belong to him in sin~if he could have committed 
incest. But since this act is as repulsive to him as 
what Caddy has done, perhaps saying it will be enough. 
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When his father asks if he tried to get Caddy to consum-
mate the act, Quentin replies, "i was afraid to i was 
afraid she might and then it wouldnt have done any good 
but if i could tell you we did it would have been so and 
then the others wouldnt be so and the world would roar 
away" (p. 195). This then is the importance of incest 
in his mind: it would isolate the two of them from every-
one else, and Caddy would belong to him. 
Not only has Quentin "lost touch with the eter-
nal," he has also lost touch with both present and future. 
His mind is permanently fixed on the past. Although the 
individual who inhabits the aesthetical stage is commonly 
in touch only with the present and maintains a detached 
view of life, the important characteristic is that he 
avoids decisions and choices. Actually, though, even the 
aesthete is forced to make one choice, and that is the 
choice not to choose. 38 Everything that happens to 
Quentin, including his suicide, has its direct relation-
ship to the past. The past does not blend with his pres-
ent and color it; he has no present, or at most, his past 
is his present. Even the act of suicide does not seem to 
occur in the present, for it is a foregone conclusion 
from the beginning of Quentin's section in the book. Re-
garding life or death, he has no choice, since a life 
concentrated on the past is not a life anyway. In effect, 
he died on the afternoon Caddy's loss of innocence was 
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discovered. 
When Kierkegaard speaks of the eternal being em-
bodied in time, he speaks of a phenomenon which has far-
reaching implications for the existing individual. The 
person who inhabits the religious stage understands and 
accepts this phenomenon without question. 
has no problem with the concept of time. 
He therefore 
The ethical 
individual believes that he also understands this pheno-
menon; however, his understanding of the eternal has no 
connection with God. Judge William, one of Kierkegaard's 
ethical pseudonyms, has this to say: "The married man, 
being a true conqueror, has not killed time but has 
saved it and preserved it in eternity. .He splves 
the great riddle of living in eternity and yet hearing 
the hall clock strike, and hearing it in such a way that 
the stroke of the hour does not shorten but prolong his 
eternity .• "39 Eternity for the ethicist is not 
grounded in Christ but in human potentiality. Although 
he does not grasp the significance of time and eternity 
according to Kierkegaard's religious viewpoint, the ethi-
cist believes that he understands; therefore, like the 
religious individual, he has no problem with the concept 
of time. The aesthete, on the other hand, has no concept 
of the eternal being embodied in time; and because he 
cannot grasp this concept, time becomes his enemy. 
Grimsley explains this way: 
The Diapsalmata [a section of Either/Or] 
indicate one of the main problems of the 
"aesthetic" life: its failure to deal satis-
factorily with the question of time. Al-
though the aesthetic individual lives in one 
"natural" dimension, in a single mood or 
colour . • • he can establish no genuine 
temporal continuity: his life lacks unity 
because it consists only of separate dis-
crete moments, as he passes from one feeling 
to another without remaining permanently 
identified with any. Consequently, com-
plaints about the meaninglessness of his 
existence form a characteristic ref rain in 
these reflections. The diapsalmatist seems 
to exist in a void, with time flowing cease-
lessly past him; on other occasions, time 
seems to have the opposite effect of stand-
ing still .••. It is characteristic of the 
"aesthetic" individual that he should seem 
incapable of development.~ 0 
The ultimate symbol of reality for Quentin is 
time. Time is what has destroyed the innocence and 
peace he experienced as a child. Time has ruined his 
relationship with Caddy. It has made her, as Jason 
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would say, "a bitch." No matter how we as readers inter-
pret Caddy's actions, what essentially troubles Quentin 
is his conviction, whether he admits it to himself or 
not, that Caddy really is a bitch. This is what he can-
not bear about Caddy, and what has made her a bitch is 
time. Early in his section of the book, Quentin breaks 
his watch in a symbolic attempt to stop time. But the 
watch continues to tick, and throughout the day, he in-
termittently hears the ticking of this broken indicator 
of time. Chimes mark the hour, the half hour, the 
quarter hour, accentuating his inability to escape time. 
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Finally, he stops time in the only way that it is possi-
ble to do s.o: he commits suicide. 
Section II of The Sound and the Fury is, as Ed-
mund Volpe says, "a heartfelt cry of despair, one of the 
most moving expressions of disillusionment and suffering 
in literature. It dramatizes that state of mind and 
soul that existentialists have described and that Sartre 
has termed l'angoise, when man knows absolute despair 
and either commits suicide or develops a vision that 
gives meaning to existence."'+ 1 Quentin can find no mean-
ing for his existence w.~ thout Caddy. He allows himself 
to be overcome by suffering, as the aesthete is very 
likely to do", and this results in what George Bedell 
calls "existential paralysis." There is, in effect, no 
course open for Quentin. Perhaps he has taken the words 
of his father too literally: "Father said a man is the 
sum of his misfortunes. One day you'd think misfortune 
would get tired, but then time is your misfortune Father 
said" (p. 123). Time is indeed Quentin's misfortune, 
and his attempt to efface this misfortune leads to his 
death. For Quentin "its not despair until time its not 
even time until it was" (p. 197}. In Kierkegaardian 
terms, Quentin's despair is the despair of weakness, a 
passive suffering of the self. Unlike the purely immed-
iate man, Quentin does have some conception of what it 
means to have a self, but "he has no consciousness of a 
self which is gained by the infinite abstraction from 
everything outward, this naked, abstract self . . . 
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which is the first form of the infinite self and the 'for-
ward impulse in the whole process whereby a self infi-
nitely accepts its actual self with all its difficulties 
and advantages."~ 2 
Jason, like Quentin, is trapped in the aestheti-
cal stage, but his manner of dwelling aesthetically is 
quite different from Quentin's. Jason is remarkably suc-
cessful at doing what Quentin subconsciously wanted to do 
but could not: he looks upon all people, himself included, 
as objects. Both Caddy and his niece Quentin are used 
for the money he can extort from them, and his mother is 
important to him only because of the part she plays in 
making this extortion possible. His relationship to 
Lorraine, the Memphis prostitute, has its basis only in 
sensuousness. But the erotic quality of this sensuous-
ness lacks the strength of a seducer's relationship with 
a woman. Not once does he speak of Lorraine in a manner 
that would indicate even a temporary feeling of desire 
or affection. She is just someone else to be manipu-
lated: "I never promise a woman anything nor let her know 
what I'm going to give her. That's-the only way to man-
age them. Always keep them guessing. If you can't think 
of any other way to surprise them, give them a bust in 
the jaw" (p. 211). 
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Jason maintains, through his treatment of others 
as objects, the detached view of life common to the aes-
thete. His alienation is complete: he loves no one, 
trusts no one. Other people are important to him only 
in so far as he can manipulate them for gain. As Bedell 
says, "He stood in no ethical relation to anyone or even 
to himself .... He would attempt to shore-up his exis-
tence by acquisition." 43 
Jason, although he appears to be self-assured and 
confident, has actually placed himself at the mercy of 
fate and external forces. For every misfortune in his 
life, he has someone or something else to blame. What he 
spends most of his time doing is whining and complaining: 
"I never had time to go to Harvard like Quentin or drink 
myself into the ground like Father. I had to work" (p. 
199). His having to stay in Jefferson and work as a 
clerk in someone else's store is attributed to the fail-
ure of Herbert Head, Caddy's husband, to set Jason up in 
his bank as he had promised. "Then when she sent Quentin 
home for me to feed too I says I guess that's right too, 
instead of me having to go way up ~orth for a job they 
sent the job down here to me ... " (p. 214). Bitterness 
regarding this broken promise is one of the few things 
from the past that troubles Jason, and it surfaces during 
his most hateful actions toward others. The first time 
that Caddy returns to see Quentin, he allows her to do so 
only for a second (for which Caddy has to pay him one 
hundred dollars). Then, when he learns that Caddy did 
not take the next train out of town, he threatens to 
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make it impossible for her ever to see Quentin again and 
thereby gets her to leave. Immediately afterwards he 
says, "I reckon you'll think twice before you deprive me 
of a job that was promised me. I was a kid then. I be-
lieved folks when they said they'd do things. I've 
learned better since" (p. 224). Jason accepts no re-
sponsibility for his own life. He cherishes suffering 
as a way to avoid making choices. He tells himself his 
family is to blame for his predicament when in fact it 
is he himself who is the problem. He does not realize 
that he can choose his own being and therefore is trapped 
in despair. 
Although Jason does see some events in the past 
as significant~Herbert's promise to get him a job, his 
father's alcoholism, the selling of Benjy's pasture to 
pay for Quentin's schooling and Caddy's wedding~his 
mind is fixed mainly on the future. He has, for the most 
part, cut himself off from both the past and the present 
in his search for the money which he believes will serve 
as a reinforcement for himself. The present is important 
only in that this is the time in which he must accumulate 
that money. According to Kierkegaard, "The unhappy per-
son is one who has his ideal, the content of his life, 
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the fullness of his consciousness, the essence of his be-
ing, in some manner outside himself. He is always ab-
sent, never present to himself." 44 Jason is doomed be-
cause of this absence. He never becomes reconciled to 
time. 
Caddy seems almost to dwell in two stages at once, 
a phenomenon Kierkegaard says is not possible. But ac-
cording to Bedell, "Kierkegaard admits that categories 
may overlap. That is to say, although one cannot in-
dwell two modalities simultaneously, one may indwell a 
modality that combines characteristics of two or more 
categories. Thus, we often hear Kierkegaard speak of 
'the ethico-religious' individual, 'the aesthetic~ethi­
cal' person, aesthetical religiousness,' and so forth." 45 
Caddy dwells in the aesthetic-ethical stage. As is char-
acteristic of the aesthete, she lives for the present mo-
ment. In fact, she is the only Compson who does live in 
the present. Eroticism is her dominant characteristic, 
but this is not a trait she has chosen, at least not at 
first: "There was something terrible in me sometimes at 
night I could see it grinning at me I could see it 
through them grinning at me through their faces it's gone 
now and I'm sick" {p. 131). She seems to have chose her 
body, but the number of lovers she has indicates a lack 
of permanence in her relationships with others; conse-
quently, there is no choice at all. The Kierkegaardian 
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choice is more than a whim. It involves both inwardness 
and commitment. Caddy's choices of lovers involve 
neither of these. The choices she makes are not even 
choices to manipulate others; if anything, she is mani-
pulated by them. When Quentin wants to know if there 
have been very many lovers, she replies, "I dont know 
too many ••• " But in the next breath she asks, "will 
you look after Benjy and Father" (p. 134). Although she 
lives for the present moment, she also possesses an ethi-
cal sense of duty. Even as a child, she is the one who 
looks after Benjy and tries to keep the family running 
smoothly. When her mother cries in exasperation over not 
being able to quiet Benjy, Caddy, aged seven, says, "Hush, 
Mother .... You go upstairs and lay down, so you can be 
sick. I'll go get Dilsey" (p. 83). Years later, she 
pleads with Jason to show her daughter Quentin some kind-
ness, to see that she has the kinds of things other girls 
have. In contrast to the other members of the family, 
Caddy.does make some choices. It is her choice to give 
Quentin up, although she seems to feel driven to do so. 
It is not, however, something someone else forces her to 
do. It is a choice she makes because of a sense of duty, 
because she believes the remaining .Compsons can rear the 
child better than she. 
Mr. and Mrs. Compson, both completely withdrawn 
from life, are also aesthetes. Mrs. Compson is in love 
34 
with suffering. She cherishes it as only an aesthete 
can. It is her excuse to avoid making any decisions or 
choices and allows her to remain shut up in her room, 
away from the world, reveling in her interminable ill-
ness. Mr. Compson does nothing except mete out his phi-
losophy to those who will listen. Bedell characterizes 
Mr. Compson as well when he says of Jason, ". the 
person who 'thinks about' life without making the either/ 
or decision (the metaphysician) dwells in the most re-
fined form of aestheticism." 46 Whereas Mrs. Compson has 
her "illness" to keep her apart from the rest of the 
world, Mr. Compson has alcoholism. Both are completely 
alienated fro~ reality. 
Of the entire household, Dilsey is the only charac-
ter able to deal with reality. "Only Dilsey," Bedell 
says, "who lives in time as though it contains eternity, 
is able to 'endure' or 'prevail. '" 47 Religiousness is 
the stage which she inhabits. Time is never wrong for 
her, even when she has to decipher it by means of a clock 
possessing only one hand and always three hours slow: "On 
the wall above a cupboard . . . a cabinet clock ticked, 
then with a preliminary sound as if it had cleared its 
throat, struck five times. 'Eight oclock,' Dilsey said" 
(p. 290). She has not removed herself from the world in 
order that God may appear, as the individual who dwells 
in religiousness A would do; instead, she is "in the 
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world but not of it." God has come, as far as she is 
concerned, and she is able to accept herself because she 
knows that she has been accepted by God: 
Huh, Dilsey said. Name aint going to 
help him. Hurt him, neither. Folks dont 
have no luck, changing names. My name been 
Dilsey since fore I could remember and it 
be Dilsey when they's long forgot me. 
How will they know it's Dilsey, when 
it's long forgot, Dilsey, Caddy said. 
It'll be in the Book, honey, Dilsey 
said. Writ out. 
Can you read it, Caddy said. 
Wont have to, Dilsey said. They'll read 
it for me. All I got to do is say Ise here. 
(p. 77) 
Suffering to Dilsey is a way of life, but not in 
the wame way that it is for the Compsons. She accepts it 
as an integral part of life. She neither allows it to 
govern her life nor revels in it. It is for her, as for 
Kierkegaard's religious individual, a way of serving her 
fellows. She usually manages, although she suffers, to 
create a sense of order where none actually exists. In 
the face of her suffering and that of others, religious-
ness is a force that makes all beings equal. In Kierke-
gaard's words, "The Christianity of the New Testament is 
infinitely high; but ... it is not high in such a 
sense that it has to do with the difference between man 
and man with respect to intellectual capacity .... No, 
it is for all. Everyone . if he absolutely wills 
it ... will absolutely put up with everything, suffer 
everything . . . then is this infinite height attainable 
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to him." 48 While Benjy does not possess the mentality 
to choose the religious stage, he too is one of God's 
creatures as far as Dilsey is concerned. When Frony com-
plains about her bringing Benjy to church because people 
are beginning to talk, she replies, "Den you send um to 
me. .Tell um de good Lawd dont keer whether he smart 
or not. Dont nobody but white trash keer dat" (p. 306). 
We must assume that Dilsey has previously experi-
enced resignation and has subsequently made the "leap" 
into the religious stage. She clearly possesses faith, 
and Kierkegaard says that an individual cannot receive 
faith without first experiencing resignation: "The infi-
nite resignation is the last stage prior to faith, so 
that one who has not made this movement has not faith; 
for only in the infinite resignation do I become clear to 
myself with respect to my eternal validity, and only then 
can there by any question of grasping existence by virtue 
of faith." 49 Although we do not see the actual act or 
process of resignation within the novel itself (because 
we meet Dilsey as a religious character and she remains 
in the same stage throughout the book), it must necessar-
ily have taken place. One does not become religious 
without first accepting (choosing) himself and accepting 
life as it is, which is essentially· the meaning of re-
signation. 
The characters in The Sound and the Fury are, in 
one way or another, representative of each of Kierke-
37 
gaard's three stages. In Faulkner's world, as in Kierke-
gaard's, the religious individual is a rarity. Most of 
the major characters in The Sound and the Fury dwell in 
the aesthetical stage. Only one progresses to the aes-
thetic-ethical stage, which is only slightly more satis-
factory than the aesthetic, and only one reaches the re-
ligious stage. 
Jason and Quentin, although both aesthetes, are in 
some ways almost exact opposites. Quentin suffers be-
cause he cannot achieve the personal detachment that he 
thinks will ease his suffering, while Jason manages to 
maintain a detachment from everyone, including himself. 
Quentin's problem with time is the past; Jason's is the 
future. But both Quentin and Jason are aesthetes in that 
neither is able to make fundamental choices and neither 
is in touch with the eternal. 
Mr. and Mrs. Compson are also aesthetes, but their 
existence in the aesthetical stage is manifested in a 
different manner from that of either Jason or Quentin. 
They retreat from life in illness and in alcoholism, 
neither participating in nor actively concerned with the 
real business of living. What sense of duty either pos-
sesses is buried beneath the crutch each uses as a means 
of escaping life. The fact that they are married makes 
no difference. The ethical person holds marriage in high 
esteem, but it does not follow that marriage makes a per-
son ethical. Judge William informs us that certain 
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aesthetes are quite willing to accept marriage, but 
that they attach no real significance to it. For the 
aesthete, marriage is likely to be a mere civil arrange-
ment. 50 It is quite possible that this is the kind of 
marriage the Compsons have; on the other hand, it is 
just as possible that they entered into the marriage 
as ethicists and later became aesthetes. We have no way 
of knowing from the novel itself. We see them through-
out as aesthetes who make no choices, who place them-
selves at the mercy of fate, and who avoid inwardness and 
duty. 
Caddy differs from the other Compsons in that she 
possesses a sense of duty. Her category, the aesthetic-
ethical, combines qualities of both the aesthetic and the 
ethical stages. While she is unable to make an ethical 
choice (for the most part) and lives primarily for the 
moment, her sense of duty places her in the realm of the 
ethical. Her attitude toward time is different also: 
she is the only Compson who lives in the present. 
In reaching the religious stage, Dilsey achieves a 
serenity and an ability to cope with life's problems that 
the Compsons lack. Although she too suffers, she is 
quite capable of enduring whatever life has to offer. 
she also differs from the Compsons in her attitude toward 
time. She is the only member of the household who is in 
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touch with the eternal. 
In the characters examined so far, we have seen 
that each of Kierkegaard's stages is adequately exempli-
fied; yet still other possibilities exist for the aes-
thete and the ethicist, as will be seen by examining two 
other novels. In reading Kierkegaard, we find that there 
are numerous existential avenues open to the aesthete, 
all of which fail. There is also more than one existen-
tial possibility for the ethicist, though not as many as 
for the aesthete. These too ultimately fail. But there 
is only one possible way of life for the purely reli-
gious person, and perhaps this is why so few reach the 
religious stage. This is not to say that those who in-
habit the religious stage are not individuals. They 
naturally have their particular individuality and self-
hood. But all religious individuals must assume the 
proper attitude toward suffering; they must all under-
stand and accept the paradoxical idea of the eternal be-
ing embodied in time; they must all experience resigna-
tion (the choice of selfhood and the pursuit of life re-
gardless of its flaws); and they must all ultimately at-
tain faith. As aesthetes and aesthetic-ethicists, 
Faulkner's major characters in The Sound and the Fury 
also exemplify diverse existential possibilities for in-
dividuals in these stages. Only the religious character 
stands apart as pursuing one particular way of life. 
CHAPTER III 
LIGHT IN AUGUST 
Light in August has been referred to as "a study 
of the attempts of alienated people to flee into some 
sort of solidarity." 51 Joe Christmas epitomizes the 
alienated person who craves solidarity; but because he 
does not actively seek this solidarity, because he does 
not even know what it is that he seeks, he remains in 
the aesthetical stage of existence, alienated from his 
surroundings and lost in the world. 
No one, not even Joe himself, knows what his back-
ground is. Because he was called "nigger" by children 
at the orphanage where he spent his first five years, he 
thinks there might be a black person in his ancestry, 
but he is not certain of this. When he appears in Jef-
ferson, he is described in this way: " ... there was 
something definitely rootless about him, as though no 
town nor city was his, no street, no walls, no square of 
earth his home. And ... he carried his knowledge with 
him always as though it were a banner, with a quality 
ruthless, lonely, and almost proud." 52 Not only is he 
homeless, he is nameless as well: 
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"His name is what?" one said. 
"Christmas." 
"Is he a foreigner?" 
"Did you ever hear of a white man 
named Christmas?" the foreman said. 
"I never heard of nobody a-tall named 
it," the other said. (pp. 28-29) 
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Christmas is the name he was given when he was found on 
the doorstep of the orphanage when he was an infant, but, 
for him and for the people with whom he associates, it 
is worse than no name at all because it gives no indica-
tion of who he is or what his roots are. 
Joe is to remain in this state of not knowing who 
he is for the duration of his life. He is like the young 
aesthete that Judge William describes in Eibher/Or. Life 
for the aesthete, according to Judge William, is.a mas-
querade. No one succeeds in really knowing him. The 
revelations he makes are_only illusions, for he must pre-
serve his enigmatical mask at all costs. The aesthete 
who assumes this attitude loses his own sense of self. 
Judge William states it this way: "In fact you are noth-
ing; you are merely a relation to others, and what you 
are you are by virtue of this relation." 53 Joe Christmas 
is this type of aesthete. Throughout the book we see him, 
for the most part, only as others see him. Very little 
is told from his point of view. We get the details of 
Joanna's murder, of Joe's subsequent capture, and finally 
of his "crucifixion" through the eyes of other characters. 
He emerges, therefore, as less than human, as simply a 
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thought in somebody else's mind. 5 ~ 
Whether consciously or not, Christmas works to 
prevent others from knowing him. He does not make the 
choice between black and white and will not allow anyone 
else to make it. Whenever he begins to be accepted as a 
white man, he takes obvious.steps to deny the label, 
while at the same time maintaining a doubt that will not 
allow others to classify him in any definite way. An ex-
ample of this is his answer when Joanna questions him 
about his background: 
"You dont have any idea who your parents 
were?" 
If she could have seen his face she would 
have found it sullen, brooding. "Except that 
one of them was part nigger. Like I told you 
before." 
She was still looking at him •••• "How 
do you know that?" 
He didn't answer for some time. Then he 
said: "I dent know-it." Again his voice 
ceased .... Then he spoke again .... "If 
I'm not, damned if I haven't wasted a lot of 
time • " ( p . 2 2 2 - 2 3 ) 
Christmas' masquerade is only part of the larger 
picture of his detachment and alienation. He follows 
scrupulously "A's" command to avoid friendship and mar-
riage. Lucas Burch is simply· someone he can manipulate. 
The relationship between the two has none of the camara-
derie of friendship. Neither trusts the other, and Burch is 
actually afraid of Christmas. Judge William would not be 
surprised at their relationship. He describes the young 
aesthete as one who must constantly be in opposition with 
43 
"the other." Because he is afraid of inwardness, the 
opposition must be kept alive; otherwise, he might be 
forced into the very thing he fears. His opposition to 
others allows him to remain outside himself.ss 
Christmas has kept this opposition alive from the 
time he was a child, but nowhere is it more apparent than 
in his relationship with Joanna Burden. Their liaison 
from the beginning is one of reciprocal struggle. Their 
first sexual encounter is described in this way: "There 
was no feminine vacillation, no coyness of obvious de-
sire and intention to succumb at last. It was as if he 
struggled physically with another man for an object of 
no actual value to either, and for which they st~uggled 
on principle alone" (p. 205). Each treats the other as 
an object, and their involvement with each other makes 
no progress toward a meaningful relationship. For Christ-
mas it is nothing more than a way to avoid inwardness. 
He thinks, "I better move. I better get away from here" 
(p. 228), but he does not go. He is trapped in the oppo-
sition that allows him to avoid himself. Even when he 
refuses to see her for long periods of time, he cannot 
free himself: " ... when he first went to work, he 
would not need to think of her during the day; he hardly 
ever thought of her. Now he could not help himself. She 
was in his mind so constantly that it was almost as if he 
were looking at her, there in the house, patient, waiting, 
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inescapable, crazy" (p. 135). 
Ultimately, Christmas finds that he cannot escape 
an inward look at himself, but he is so accustomed to a 
life governed by externals that it does no good. He 
attributes his situation to fate, another external: "And 
as he sat in the shadow of the ruined garden on that Au-
gust night three months later ••• he believed with 
calm paradox that he was the volitionless servant of the 
fatality in which he believed that he did not believe. 
He was saying to himself I had to do it already in the 
past tense; I had to do it. She said so herself" (p. 
245}. 
Because he is an aesthete, Joe cannot choose; and 
because he cannot choose, he must acquiesce to fate. 
Judge William states the aesthete's predicament in this 
way: " .•• there comes at last an instant when there no 
longer is any question of an either/or, not because he 
has chosen but because he has neglected to choose, which 
is equivalent to saying, because others have chosen for 
him, because he has lost his self." 56 
Joe Christmas lives out most of his life in de-
spai~ which Kierkegaard defines as "the disrelationship 
in a relation that relates itself to itself." 57 Christ-
mas is not conscious of the despair, but according to 
Kierkegaard, "the fact that the man in despair is unaware 
that his condition is despair, has nothing to do with the 
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case, he is in despair all the same." 58 The individual 
who is unconscious of despair is furthest from the con-
sciousness of himself as spirit. 59 This is Joe Christ-
mas' problem. His is what Kierkegaard calls "the despair-
ing unconsciousness of having a self and an eternal 
self. 1160 Since Joe lacks consciousness of his despair, 
Kierkegaard would classify this despair as minimal. When 
consciousness is least, the feeling of despair ·is least. 
But, paradoxically, the person who is unaware of his de-
spair is in despair in the most dangerous way, because 
through unawareness, the individual is securely in the 
power of despair. 61 The person who is aware of his de-
spair can strive to eliminate it, but the person who is 
unaware of despair is virtually trapped in it. 
Joanna Burden is one of the few characters who can 
be observed to move from one stage to another. When she 
meets Joe Christmas, we can assume that she has previous-
ly lived ethically. She is a virgin spinster who con-
siders it her duty to help black people to rise above 
their "condition," an idea instilled in her by her 
father. She carries out this duty meticulously. We 
learn also that she has made an ethical choice to live 
near Jefferson, although the people there shun her. It 
is clear that she has no entanglements that keep her in 
Jefferson. She therefore has chosen to be the outcast 
that she is. She has chosen, as is characteristic of the 
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ethicist, to suffer. 
With the arrival of Christmas, Joanna moves into 
the aesthetical stage, but not entirely. For Joanna the 
ethical has not been "dethroned"* by the aesthetical. 
The two stages combine in her and become the aesthetic-
ethical. Her work with the black schools continues, but 
her relationship with Joe becomes one of sensuousness or, 
to be more specific, eroticism: 
At first it shocked him: the abject 
fury of the New England glacier exposed to 
the fire of the New England biblical hell. 
Perhaps he was aware of the abnegation in 
it: the imperious and fierce urgency that 
concealed an actual despair at frustrate 
and irrevocable years, which she appeared 
to compensate each night as if she believed 
that it would be the last night on earth by 
damning herself forever to the hell of her 
forefathers, by living not alone in sin but 
in filth. She had an avidity for the for-
bidden wordsymbols; an insatiable appetite 
for the sound of them on his tongue and on 
her own. She revealed the terrible and im-
personal curiosity of a child about forbid-
den subjects and objects; that rapt and 
tireless and detached interest of a surgeon 
in the physical body and its possibilities. 
(pp. 225-26) 
This eroticism is dominant only at night: " ••• by day 
he would see the calm, coldfaced, almost manlike, almost 
middleaged woman who had lived for twenty years alone 
•.. " (p. 226). During this period, which Joe refers 
to as "the second phase," Joanna seems to be an ethicist 
during the day and an aesthete at night. 
*See p. 15. 
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The phase does not last, however. She returns 
eventually to the ethical stage. All sex activity is 
terminated, and her business with Joe is now strictly 
related to duty. She tells him of a time when she told 
her father that she must escape the shadow cast by the 
black race: 'You cannot,' he said. 'You must struggle, 
rise. But in order to rise, you must raise the shadow 
with you .... you can never lift it to your level. 
But escape it you cannot. The curse of the black race 
is God's curse. But the curse of the white race is the 
black man who will be forever God's chosen because He 
once cursed Him' (p. 222). Joe comes to represent a 
.means by which Joanna can "raise the shadow." She there-
fore asks that he declare himself black, attend a black 
college, and study law under a black lawyer. But Joe, 
being trapped in aestheticism and therefore having made 
no real choice between black and white, will not cooper-
ate. Joanna resorts to prayer and thereby seals her 
fate: "She ought not to started praying over me. She 
would have been all right if she hadn't started praying 
over me" (p. 93). Joe's resistance is the typical aes-
thetic resistance of a shift toward the ethical or the 
religious in any relationship. Joanna becomes the burden 
from which he must inevitably free himself, and the only 
way that he can be free of her is by killing her. 
The aesthetic in Joanna is "dethroned" when she 
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returns to the ethical stage: it does not disappear to-
tally, but it is no longer a motivating force of her ex-
istence. In attempting to use Joe in order to "raise 
the shadow," she denies his humanity, but she does not 
do so consciously. Her intention is just the opposite. 
She believes she is doing the only thing that will give 
Joe humanity; thus, before she explains to him what she 
wants him to do, she asks, "Do you realise . that 
you are wasting your life?" (p. 234). Her motivation is 
her ethical sense of duty, but her aestheticism is still 
evident in that she manipulates Joe for her own ends. 
Joanna clearly reaches toward the religious stage 
during the last months of her life, but she never attains 
it. At first she actively resists the impulse. Toward 
the end of the period in which ~he inhabits the aesthe-
tic-ethical stage, we read, 
What was terrible was that she did not want 
to be saved. "I'm not ready to pray yet," 
she said aloud, quietly, rigid, soundless, 
her eyes wide open, while the moon poured 
and poured into the window, filling the room 
with somethin0 cold and irrevocable and wild 
with regret. "Dont make me have to pray yet. 
Dear God, let me be damned a little longer, 
a little while." She seemed to see her 
whole past life, the starved years, like a 
gray tunnel, at the far and irrevocable end 
of which, as unfading as a reproach, her 
naked breast of three short years ago ached 
as though in agony, virgin and crucified; 
"Not yet, dear God. Not yet, dear God." 
(p. 231) 
When she does give in to the impulse, after her return 
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to the ethical stage, her resignation is evidenced by a 
search for the immanental relationship to God and the de-
struction of selfhood which are emphasized in religious-
ness A: 
She prayed again. She spoke quietly, 
with that abjectness of pride. When it was 
necessary to use the symbolwords which he 
had taught her, she used them, spoke them 
forthright and without hesitation, talking 
to God as if He were a man in the room with 
two other men. She spoke of herself and of 
him as of two other people, her voice still, 
monotonous, sexless •..• (p. 245) 
The religiousness Joanna seeks, according to 
Kierkegaard, is not religiousness at all: "The immediate 
relationship to God is paganism, and only after the 
breach has taken place can there be any question of a 
true God-relationship." 62 Furthermore, "a direct rela-
tionship between one spiritual being and another, with 
respect to the essential truth, is unthinkable. If such 
a relationship is assumed, it means that one of the par-
ties has ceased to be spirit.n 63 For Kierkegaard, the 
only true spiritual relationship is one of inwardness: 
"Within the individual man there is a potentiality (man 
. 
is potentially spirit) which is awakened in inwardness to 
become a God-relationship, and then it becomes possible 
to see God everywhere. The sensuous distinctions of the 
great, the astonishing, the shrieking superlatives of a 
southern people, constitute a retreat to idolatry, in 
comparison with the spiritual relationship of inwardness. 116 '+ 
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When Joanna seeks to destroy her selfhood in order 
to have a relationship with God, as she implies when in 
her prayer she speaks of herself and Joe as two other 
people, she annihilates the quality necessary for inward-
ness and a real spiritual relationship. Thus she never 
attains religiousness because she is looking for it out-
side herself. 
In a Kierkegaardian hierarchy, Joanna emerges as 
a much more complicated individual than does Joe Christ-
mas, and she attains a higher level of existence. She 
is able to achieve ethical inwardness, which leads her 
to seek God; but in seeking God, she denies her own self-
hood, thus destroying the inwardness she needs in order 
to find Him. She is just beginning the throes of resig-
nation, but she does not realize that in order to choose 
God, she must first choose herself. In Kierkegaard's 
words, 
For the act of resignation faith is not re-
auired, for what I gain by resignation is 
my eternal consciousness, and this is a 
purely philosophical movement which I dare 
say I am able to make if it is required, and 
which I can train myself to make, for when-
ever any finiteness would get the mastery 
over me, I starve myself until I can make 
the movement, for my eternal consciousness 
is my love to God, and for me this is higher 
than everything. 65 
Christmas is much simpler to classify than Joanna. 
He remains the same throughout his life, never gaining 
the necessary sense of self to make the leap out of the 
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aesthetical stage. He is trapped in the despair which 
results from a failure to recognize the self as spirit. 
But there is a kinship between Joe and Joanna. 
Although Joanna is just the opposite of Joe in her atti-
tude toward blacks, she is just the same in the position 
in which she finds herself because of this attitude. 
Joe considers being black a kind of damnation. Joanna, 
on the other hand, has the idea that her salvation lies 
in helping blacks. Both are caught midway between two 
extremes: black and white. Joe is caught in the middle 
because he can identify with neither; Joanna, because 
she believes that her father was correct in his assess-
ment that both races are cursed. It is clear that Faulk-
ner intends us to see a similarity in their characters, 
and he insures the recognition by giving the two of them 
similar names. In the Kierkegaardian scheme, the kin-
ship between Joe and Joanna places both in despair be-
cause they both "obscurely repose or terminate in an ab-
stract universality,"* namely, race consciousness. 
One other similarity in the personalities of Joe 
and Joanna must be mentioned.- Both find that life is 
unbearable and decide to end it. We have seen that Joe's 
resistance of Joanna's attempt to release him from aes-
theticism leads him to murder her. But a closer look 
shows that Joanna's murder is a kind of suicide as far 
*Seep. 17. 
52 
Joe is concerned. He knows that he will be caught, but 
even more important is the fact that he does not try 
very hard to avoid being caught. The fact that he eludes 
the sheriff and the hounds for a week is largely due to 
their own ineptitude. He puts forth no real effort to 
stay away from them. For a while it is almost a game to 
him, but then he gets tired of running and walks into a 
town where he is sure to be recognized. He wants to be 
caught and punished just as he wanted to be punished 
when he ate the dietitian's toothpaste as a child; and 
he certainly knows what the punishment will be. He will 
have to undergo a modern-day crucifixion, which is what 
he thinks he deserves. 
Joanna has also decided on suicide. When Joe re-
fuses to pray with her on the night before her death, 
she draws an old pistol and fires at him. The gun does 
not fire, however. We learn her purpose when Joe stops 
to examine the pistol he took with him when he left her 
bedroom: 
The match burned down and went out, yet he 
still seemed to see th~ ancient thing with 
its two loaded chambers; the one upon which 
the hammer had already fallen and which had 
not exploded, and the other upon which no 
hammer had yet fallen but upon which a ham-
mer had been planned to fall .. 'For her and 
for me,' he said. (p. 250) 
For both Joanna and Joe, despair leads (though in a 
roundabout way) to suicide. But to Kierkegaard, suicide 
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is not a satisfactory solution because it is a rebellion 
against God. 6 6 
CHAPTER IV 
ABSALOM, ABSALOMl 
The presence of Thomas Sutpen pervades every page 
of Absalom, Absalom! Not for one moment is the reader 
allowed to lose himself in details of another charac-
ter's life. Although he has been dead for forty-one 
years when the novel opens, he is the character who 
really lives in the book. Perhaps the reason is that 
even after his death and the passage of time, he still 
remains an enigma to those who know and know of him. 
As difficult as it is to think of the word ethical 
in terms of Stupen, he dwells in the aesthetic-ethical 
stage. Although the aesthetic characteristics outnumber 
the ethical, they do not dominate. Both are present in 
him throughout the book, and we never see him as more 
one than the other. Sutpen possesses none of the erotic 
qualities characteristic of the aesthete. Instead, his 
aestheticism is seen through his detachment, his identi-
fication of himself through externals, his treatment of 
others as objects, and his attitude.toward time. The 
ethical aspects of his character are seen only through 
the choices he makes and his attitude toward fate. 
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Sutpen's aesthetical detachment is posited in the 
opening pages of the book. As far as the people of 
Jefferson know, he has no roots. He is to them as to 
Miss Rosa, "a man who rode into town out of nowhere 
with a horse and two pistols and a herd of wild beasts 
II 6 7 They know nothing of his background and 
therefore do not trust him: "He came here with a horse 
and two pistols and a name nobody ever heard before, 
knew for certain was hi~ own any more than the horse was 
his own or even the pistols, seeking some place to hide 
himself ... " (p. 15). 
The people of Jefferson are never to learn very 
much about Sutpen's background. He tells his s~ory to 
only one man, Quentin's grandfather, and even in telling 
the story, he maintains his aesthetical detachment: 
" ... he was not talking about himself. He was telling 
a story. He was not bragging about something he had 
done; he was just telling a story about something a man 
named Thomas Sutpen had experienced, which would have 
been the same story if the man had had no name at all, 
if it had been told about any man or no man over whiskey 
at night" (p. 247). It is this detachment which 
leads Rosa Coldfield to say, forty-one years after Sut-
pen' s death, "He was not articulated in this world. He 
was a walking shadow. He was ·the light-blinded bat-like 
image of his own torment cast by the fierce demoniac 
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lantern up from beneath the earth's crust and hence in 
retrograde, reverse ... " {p. 171). 
Like Kierkegaard's immediate man, Sutpen recog-
nizes that he has a self only through externals.* The 
most obvious example of this characteristic in Sutpen 
is his "design." Sutpen was innocent when his family 
came down from the mountains of West Virginia and set-
tled in Tidewater. At ten years old, 
... he had never even heard of, never 
imagined a place, a land divided neatly 
up and actually owned by men who did 
nothing but ride over it on fine horses 
or sit in fine clothes on the galleries 
of big houses while other people worked 
for them; he did not even imagine then 
that there was any such way to live or · 
want to live, or that there existed all 
the objects to be wanted which there were~ 
or that the ones who owned the objects not 
only could look down on the ones that 
didn't, but could be supported in the 
downlooking not only by the others who 
owned objects too but by the very ones 
that were looked down on that didn't own 
objects and knew they never would. {p. 221) 
Into this strange, new universe, Thomas Sutpen is cast; 
and, according to Quentin's grandfather at least, he 
never loses his innocence. He soon learns, however, 
that not only is there a difference between white men 
and black men, but that there is also a difference be-
tween white men and white men. And shortly after he 
gains this knowledge, something happens that is the 
*Seep. 7. 
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beginning of his design. His father sends him to the 
plantation on which they work to deliver a message. He 
approaches the front door: " ..• and he never even re-
membered what the nigger said, how it was the nigger 
told him, even before he had time to say what he came 
for, never to come to that front door again but to go 
around to the back" (p. 232) . 
Years later, when Sutpen tells the story to Quen-
tin's grandfather, he insists that the incident did not 
anger him, but "he knew that something would have to be 
done about it: he would have to do something about it 
in order to live with himself for the rest of his life 
." (p. 234). He is not fighting against th~ black 
man who sent him to the back door but against the sys-
tem, the system represented by the man who owns the 
plantation. He finds himself compelled to combat in 
some way both this plantation owner and the others of 
his kind, and in order to do so he must gain the same 
material things that they have: land, slaves, and money. 
Thus begins Sutpen's design, and it is to govern 
his life until he dies. He has no time for inwardness 
because the entire meaning of his life exists in this 
external plan. 
Obsession with the accomplishment of his design 
leads Sutpen to use other people as objects, which is 
typical of the aesthete. Because a wife is essential 
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to his plans, he marries: " .. and he told grand-
father • . . how he had put his first wife aside like 
eleventh- and twelfth-century kings did: 'I found that 
she was not and could never be, through no fault of her 
own, adjunctive or incremental to the design which I 
had in mind, so I provided for her and put her aside'" 
(p. 240). This wife, Eulalia, can play no part in Sut-
pen's design because he discovers that she is not ra-
cially pure, that one of her not so distant ancestors 
was partially black. 
All individuals are objects to Sutpen and are im-
portant only in so far as they are adjunctive to his 
plan. Ironically, it is partly because of his inhumane 
treatment of these others whom he considers necessary 
to his· design that his plan fails. Eulalia is driven 
to her desire for vengeance because in putting her 
aside, Sutpen denies her humanity. Miss Rosa Cold-
field' s outrage stems from the same ·kind of treatment. 
Shreve is correct in classifying Sutpen as less than 
human: " ... if he hadn't been a demon . she 
wouldn't have had to go out there and find instead 
of a widowed Agamemnon to her Cassandra an ancient 
stiff-jointed Pyramus to her eager though untried Thisbe 
who could approach her in this unbidden April's com-
pounded demonry and suggest that they breed together for 
test and sample and if it was a boy they would marry" 
(p. 177). His final attempt to reestablish his dynasty 
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is yet another example of his denial of another person's 
humanity. He is no longer concerned with a suitable 
wife; all he wants now is a son. The young granddaugh-
ter of Wash Jones will serve the purpose. But when she 
bears a daughter instead of a son, he says, "Well, 
Milly, too bad you're not a mare like Penelope. 
could give you a stall in the stable" (p. 185). 
Then I 
Sutpen's mind, for the most part, is fixed on the 
future. There is a brief period when his design seems 
to be working during which he inhabits the present, but 
as soon as something threatens his plan, his mind be-
comes fixed on the future and the reestablishment of his 
design. He is therefore constantly fighting aga~nst time, 
as the aesthete commonly does. Even as a young man, he 
shows evidence of this fight against time: " . he 
was at this time completely the slave of his secret and 
furious impatience, his conviction gained from whatever 
that recent experience had been . . of a need for 
haste, of time fleeing beneath him, which was to drive 
him for the next five years . . roughly until about 
nine months before his son was born" (p. 34). Later, 
the fight is more desperate: ". • he realized that 
there was more in his problem than just lack of time, 
that the problem contained some super-distillation of 
this lack: that he was now past sixty and that possibly 
he could get but one more son, had at best but one more 
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son in his loins, as the old cannon might know when it 
has just one more shot in its corporeality" (p. 279). 
In his fight against time, Sutpen shows that he 
is not in touch with the eternal. He thinks that he 
can posit the eternal in himself through having sons, 
but in Kierkegaard's scheme, one can gain the eternal 
only by recognizing himself as spirit. Although Sut-
pen' s fight against time is an aesthetical characteris-
tic, his means of seeking the eternal is typical of the 
ethicist. It is a matter of human potentiality and has 
no connection with God. But for Kierkegaard, gaini'ng 
the eternal is impossible without first attaining para-
doxical religiousness. In fact, attainment of the true 
God-relationship and attainment of the eternal occur 
simultaneously. 68 
For Kierkegaard, neither the aesthetical nor the 
ethical stage of existence is satisfactory, although the 
ethical is a higher stage than the aesthetical. The 
highest end is attainment of the religious stage, and 
for Kierkegaard, attainment of this end is the only pos-
sible way of living a satisfactory life. Sutpen's de-
sire to project himself through posterity resembles an 
ethical resignation: he does seek to "choose himself 
absolutely,"* but this is only half of what Kierkegaard 
means by resignation. The other half is God: "This 
*See p. 10. 
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movement [resignation] I make by myself, and what I 
gain is myself in my eternal consciousness, in blissful 
agreement with my love for the Eternal Being." 69 
So far we have seen, for the most part, only Sut-
pen's aesthetical characteristics. The ethical traits, 
though less numerous, are no less convincing. The ethi-
cal individual, as we have seen, is involved in making 
choices. Because he believes that he knows the right 
choice, he chooses with a kind of permanence. The ethi-
cal choice is marked by its seriousness. (So the ethi-
cist believes at least.) Judge William explains this 
way: 
When a man deliberates aesthetically upon 
a multitude of life's problems .•• he 
does not easily get one either/or, but a 
whole multiplicity, because the determining 
factor in the choice is not accentuated, and 
because when one does not choose absolutely 
one chooses only for the moment, and there-
fore can choose something different the 
next moment. The ethical choice is there-
fore in a certain sense much easier, much 
simpler, but in another sense it is in-
finitely harder. He who would define his 
task ethically has ordinarily not so con-
siderable a selection to choose from; on 
the other hand, the act pf choice has far 
more importance for him. If you will under-
stand me aright, I should like to say that 
in making a choice it is not so much a 
question of choosing the right as of the 
energy, the earnestness, the pathos with 
which one chooses. 70 
The major choice that Sutpen makes is the one that 
initiates his design. Once made, nothing ever happens 
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that alters this fundamental choice. Instead, all of 
the other choices he makes have their direct relation-
ship to it. After his first wife is put aside because 
of a trace of black blood in her veins, he does not 
give up. He puts this wife aside, moves from the West 
Indies (where he had gone to become rich and had begun 
to succeed) to Jefferson, swindles a hundred square 
miles of land from an Indian, builds a huge house on it, 
furnishes it by shady means never explained, and chooses 
another wife. He chooses another wife~not falls in 
love or even becomes infatuated with~simply chooses be-
cause she is not rich enough to look down her nose at 
him but well-bred enough to be a suitable mistress for 
his house. 
The ethical aspect of Sutpen's nature is not evi-
denced by the fact that he marries but by the quality of 
the choices he makes. Marriage is simply a choice that 
is necessary to the success of his design. We have no 
problem understanding that Eulalia would not have been 
cast aside except for the black blood he learns that 
she has. Almost any woman will serve in his design as 
long as she is lily white, respectable, and able to bear 
children~sons, that is. His choice of marriage is an 
ethical one because of the sense of finality with which 
he makes it each time. 
Sutpen's attitude toward fate is another aspect 
of his ethical character. He does not acquiesce to 
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fate, even when he discovers at age fifty-nine that his 
design has for a second time been destroyed. When he 
returns from the Civil War, he begins immediately to 
try to restore "Sutpen's Hundred." Although he is un-
successful (his hundred square miles of land being re-
duced to approximately one), it is not because he re-
fused or was afraid to fight. Failure of another part 
of his design is evident at this time also. Because of 
his repudiation of his first wife (who does not simply 
disappear into his past but seeks and attains vengeance), 
the son (Henry) in whom he has trusted to perpetuate 
his dynasty is lost to him. He fights against fate this 
time by· seeking to father a son by Wash Jones' young 
granddaughter. These methods of resisting fate are 
typical of those he has used throughout his life, and 
he dies still resisting fate. Wash Jones cannot forgive 
the insult inflicted upon his granddaughter and kills 
Sutpen because of it, but not without a fight. Sutpen 
does not exit life with a whimper that indicates defeat. 
The midwife who attended Milly hears Sutpen resist 
Wash's assault: "'Stand back, Wash!' sharp now, and then 
she heard the whip on Wash's face ... " (p. 286). Sut-
pen resists the doom that fate seems to have reserved 
for him until his life is over. 
It is important to note here that the sense in 
which Sutpen possesses ethical characteristics is not to 
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be confused with the sense in which ethicism denotes 
morality. He merely possesses some of the characteris-
tics common to the ethical individual. Granted, the 
direction in which he takes his ethicism would hardly 
be considered moral, particularly in the manner in which 
he chooses his wives or mates; but Kierkegaard himself, 
in speaking of the ethical principle of choice, has 
stated that " ..• if a mistake is to be made, it is 
worse to become a fickle-minded waverer than resolutely 
to carry out what has been decided upon; for a habit of 
vacillation is the absolute ruin of every spiritual re-
lationship." 72 
Sutpen's aesthetic-ethical qualities are evident 
in all of the major events of his life. His design is 
both aesthetic and ethical at once, and both the aesthe-
tic and the ethical are evident in the choices that are 
related to this design. It is impo·ssible to say that he 
is aesthetical at one time and ethical at another; the 
two categories are iptermingled so that both operate 
within him at the same time. Thus his design is aesthe-
tical in that it is an external through which he gives 
meaning to his life, but at the same time it is ethical 
in that it is a serious choice to which he is bound as 
the purely aesthetic individual could never be. Similar-
ly, sutpen's choices of wives are .aesthetical in that he 
uses these women as mere objects to further his design, 
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but at the same time they are ethical in that they are 
also serious choices which he never seeks to alter un-
less forced to for the good of his design. 
One purely aesthetic quality Sutpen possesses in 
his detachment from others, but it is not a characteris-
tic that can be seen to operate alone in him at any par-
ticular time. The design overshadows everything else 
in his life. He is ethically bound to it from his boy-
hood, and not one of his aesthetic qualities ever super-
sedes it for a moment. To classify him as purely ethi-
cal could not be considered, but to classify him as 
purely aesthetical would be just as serious a mistake. 
CONCLUSION 
Although Kierkegaard considers a step-by-step pro-
gression through the three stages neither necessary nor 
preferable, it is clear that the aesthetical stage is 
the lowest stage of human existence, that the ethical is 
higher than the aesthetical but not the ultimate, and 
that the religious stage is the highest attainable in an 
individual's quest for meaningful and satisfactory exis-
tence. The casting of the characters previously dis-
cussed into a Kierkegaardian framework or hierarchy will 
therefore not detract from Kierkegaard's concept of the 
three basic categories, but will enlighten us as to the 
reasons for the failures and successes of Faulkner's 
characters. 
Let· us begin, then, at the beginning, with a com-
parison and contrast of the characters who dwell in the 
lowest stage of existence, the aesthetical. Quentin, 
Jason, Mr. and Mrs. Compson, and Joe Christmas all inha-
bit this stage. Each character inhabits this stage in 
his own individual way, but the result is basically 
the same for all. 
We have seen that Quentin never makes a fundamen-
tal choice regarding his own being. This is also true 
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of Jason, Mr. and Mrs. Compson, and Joe Christmas. 
Quentin cannot make this choice because the inwardness 
necessary in order to choose is too painful for him; 
Jason, because he is too involved in making money and 
blaming others for his misfortune to know that the 
choice exists. The older Compsons subconsciously use 
illness and alcoholism in order to avoid making any 
choices at all; and Joe Christmas, in almost total una-
wareness that he even has a self, is obviously unable 
to choose his own particular bein9. 
Quentin possesses more inwardness than the other 
aesthetes, but this inwardness is so painful that it 
yields negative rather than positive results. Were he 
willing to accept life with the knowledge that it con-
tains imperfections, his capacity for self-reflection 
would release him from the despair of aestheticism. As 
it is, he seeks to withdraw frc:rr .. 1 if e and deny its re-
ality; but since he cannot completely do so, the only 
other alternative he can recognize is suicide. 
Joe Christmas is also afraid of inwardness, whe-
ther he knows it or not. He avoids inwardness through 
the opposition he keeps alive between himself and others. 
In this way at least he is a little more successful than 
Quentin at dwelling in the aesthetical stage. He is 
able to avoid conscious despair, but it is a deceptive 
avoidance at most. He is in despair all the same. 
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On the surface his despair yields a different result 
than Quentin's. It leads to murder rather than to sui-
cide. Joanna tries to bring him out of his aestheti-
cism, but he is not conscious enough of his own self-
hood to accept such a progression. He must therefore 
be rid of her in order to continue to dwell in the de-
spair which holds him prisoner. But Joe's realization 
that fate has decreed that he must murder Joanna is the 
same as a realization that he must also destroy himself. 
His death is in actuality no less a suicide than Quen-
tin's. 
Although Jason is also a victim of despair, he is 
able to do what Quentin would like to do but cannot; he 
is a master at using people as objects for his own gain. 
In inwardness he stands above Joe Christmas but below 
Quentin; in the ability to actively participate in the 
process of living, he stands only slightly above both. 
Perhaps his ability to remain detached is responsible 
for his success at manipulating others and himself. 
There is no Joanna Burden in his life to threaten his 
detachment, and there is not.enough self-reflection in 
his being to cause any reluctance or remorse regarding 
his treatment of others. 
Mr. and Mrs. Compson, like Quentin and Joe Christ-
mas, are both withdrawn from life; but instead of taking 
the option of s~icide, as Quentin does and as Joe 
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Christmas does indirectly, they use alcohol and illness 
as a means of escaping life and inwardness. Jason uses 
money in a similar way, but what involvement he does 
have with life is a result of his drive for the acqui-
sition of money. Money is still a means of escape, how-
ever, because his obsession with it helps him to avoid 
inwardness. 
Mr. Compson is not entirely like his wife. He 
possesses at least as much inwardness as Quentin does, 
whereas Mrs. Compson possesses virtually none. But his 
inwardness does not lead anywhere in a quest for self-
hood. He reflects about the world and other people; he 
concerns himself with philosophical questions and an-
swers; he even touches on what it means to live a mean-
ingful life. But none of his thinking about life is re-
lated strictly to himself; therefore, he is never led 
to make a choice that would release him from aestheti-
cism. He possesses an inwardness that is actually void 
of subjectivity, and it leads nowhere. 
All of the aesthetic characters discussed have a 
problem reconciling themselves to time. They cannot 
grasp the idea of the eternal being embodied in time, 
and thus their minds become fixed upon one temporal di-
mension. For Quentin and his parents it is the past; 
for Jason, the future; for Joe Christmas, it is the 
present. Kierkegaard sees this kind of existence as 
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divisive in contrast to that existence which recognizes 
the eternal as part of the finitude of time. 71 
As has been mentioned previously, existence to 
Kierkegaard is a state of becoming. Unfortunately, ex-
isting individuals are not always aware of this fact. 
They decide, if anything, to "be themselves" rather than 
to become themselves and thereby trap themselves in a 
stage that leads nowhere. Kierkegaard's view is decid-
edly pessimistic. He believes that most people, even 
those who believe they are Christians, exist in either 
aesthetic or aesthetic-ethical categories.* A survey 
of Faulkner's major works indicates the same kind of 
pessimism. Most of his characters dwell in the.same 
two categories. 
The aesthetic-ethical category is slightly more 
satisfactory than the purely aesthetic category. Indi-
viduals who dwell in this stage usually manage to con-
vince themselves that there is some meaning for their 
existence, though to Kierkegaard the meaning they find 
is a misconception. Caddy, Joanna Burden, and Sutpen 
inhabit this stage. 
Caddy emerges as somewhat better able to cope 
with life than the other Compsons. Although the fact 
that she lives for the moment is a characteristic of 
*See pp. 20-21. 
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the aesthete, this characteristic does allow her to ac-
cept life as it is; and her acceptance of life as it is 
enables her to take an active participation in it. Part 
of this participation is evidenced in her sensuality, 
but another part is evidenced in her ethical sense of 
duty. Her sense of duty, like Joanna's, has its basis 
in universal concepts of right and wrong. Sutpen, on 
the other hand, erects his own ethical norm in his "de-
sign." His duty is faithfulness to that design rather 
than to the demands of society. His problem with racism 
is more easily handled than Joe Christmas' because he 
meets it head-on rather than avoiding the issue. 
The aesthetic qualities of Caddy, Joanna, and 
Sutpen are similar in some ways but different in others. 
Both Caddy and Joanna have erotic characteristics, where-
as Sutpen has none. Neither character is in touch with 
the eternal, although Joanna makes an attempt to gain it. 
Joanna lives most of her life in the past, while Sutpen's 
mind is fixed on the future. Their attitudes toward time 
are as aesthetic as Caddy's, although Caddy lives for the 
present moment. Both Sutpen·and Joanna use people as 
objects, and both Caddy and Joanna (at times) use their 
own bodies as objects. 
Joanna and Sutpen at one time or another ethically 
resist the suffering meted out by fate, but Sutpen is 
more actively involved in this resistance. Joanna 
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chooses suffering, as is characteristic of the ethicist, 
as a way of affirming herself. She does not make an 
active attempt to eliminate it; instead, she simply 
faces up to it by refusing to leave Jefferson. Sutpen 
does not really choose suffering, but he is constantly 
fighting to keep it at bay. Suffering to him is the 
destruction of his design. Fate is its agent; thus his 
fight is directed against fate. 
Both Caddy and Sutpen are unwilling to make the 
leap out of the category in which they dwell. Joanna 
is willing, but not capable of doing so. When she can-
not make the leap, she decides upon suicide, but she 
intends to take Joe's life first. The problem is solved 
for her when her attempt fails and Joe's succeeds. 
For both Sutpen and Joanna, dwelling in the aes-
thetic-ethical stage results in despair. Joanna is more 
aware of her despair than Sutpen because she possesses 
more inwardness than he does, but Sutpen's despair is 
just as great as hers. The difference is that he does 
not stop fighting it long enough to reflect upon it. 
For the most part, the characters in the aestheti-
cal stage withdraw from life. They maintain a detach-
ment from everything and everyone,· sometimes including 
even themselves. The aesthetic-ethicists face the same 
kinds of problems that the aesthetes face, but usually 
their ethical characteristics allow them to participate 
more actively in life and to communicate better with 
others. 
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Joanna Burden is the one character from the three 
novels who can be seen to inhabit the ethical stage. 
Although the aesthetical has merely been "dethroned," 
she now possesses more of the inwardness necessary for 
spiritual fulfillment. The ethical becomes the govern-
ing principle of her life, while the aesthetical is 
subordinate to that principle. Joanna thus inhabits a 
higher stage of existence than the characters discussed 
so far, but her preoccupation with the past and her con-
sequent sense of guilt present problems which she cannot 
overcome. Joanna's renunciation of sex when she makes 
the leap from the aesthetic-ethical stage to the ethical 
stage is unavoidable because she believes she has com-
mitted some sin in cohabiting with one who is below her 
level. When she begins the act of resignation, she 
fails to progress beyond ethicism because she seeks to 
destroy her inwardness. The result is despair. 
Kierkegaard cites two basic ways of being in de-
spair. The first is "the despair which is unconscious 
that it is despair, or the despairing unconsciousness 
of having a self and an eternal self·." The second-
"the despair which is conscious of being despair, as also 
it is conscious of being a slef wherein there is after 
all something eternal"-is made manifest in one of two 
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ways: "in despair at not willing to be itself [the des-
pair of weakness], or in despair at willing to be itself 
[the despair of defiance or self-assertion]." 7 3 Joe 
Christmas, Jason, Mr. and Mrs. Compson, and Caddy exper-
ience the first kind of despair. All are virtually un-
conscious of the fact that they are in despair. Quentin 
and Joanna are conscious of their despair and therefore 
experience the second kind. It is a despair of weakness 
because they do nothing to alleviate it, but they are 
conscious of it as despair. Theirs is the despair of 
not willing to be themselves, which is initiated either 
by something earthly, by a concern about the eternal, 
or by a concern about themselves. Sutpen is also con-
scious of his despair, especially toward the end of his 
life; but his is the despair of willing to be himself, 
or the the despair of self-assertion. 
Above Joanna and all the other characters, we find 
Dilsey, a black woman who, in these three novels at 
least, is the only character who reaches the stage of 
paradoxical religiousness.* She is the only character 
who has no problem with the concept of time, the only 
one who does not let herself be overcome by suffering, 
the only one whose life is not governed by externals. 
*Bedell goes even further: "The one figure in the 
Faulknerian canon who stands clearly within the cate-
gory of paradoxical religiousness is Dilsey .•. (p. 
244) • 
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She is one of those individuals of whom Faulkner says, 
"They endured." 
Faulkner seems to be saying that the simple people 
like Dilsey are the ones able to achieve religiousness. 
Kierkegaard, on the other hand, believes that religious-
ness is for all, regardless of intellectual ability.* 
At any rate, Faulkner is not nearly so serious about 
religion as Kierkegaard is. In his words, "The writer 
must write out of his background. He must write out of 
what he knows and the Christian legend is part of any 
Christian's background .... It's just there. It has 
nothing to do with how much of it I might believe or 
disbelieve-it's just there. 1174 
If we look at the characters in his novels, Faulk-
ner seems to be as pessimistic about the fate of mankind 
as Kierkegaard, who believes that only a few people at-
tain the religious stage 75 and that therefore only a 
few people live satisfactory lives. But when we compare 
Faulkner's assertions with those of Kierkegaard, Faulk-
ner emerges as the more optimistic of the two:"I be-
lieve that man will not merely endure: he will prevail 
. because he has a soul, a spirit capable of com-
passion and sacrifice and endurance. 1176 
Dilsey is not the only character in Faulkner who 
*See p. 35. 
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"endures" or "prevails," but the others will not stand 
the· test of Kierkegaard's religious stage. For Faulk-
ner, the characters who prevail or endure are those who 
find meaningful relationships with others, those who 
see a spiritual kinship with the natural world, or 
those who, like Dilsey, accept themselves and life as 
they are and find meaning for their existence through 
faith. 
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